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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW:
EXPORTING MODERNITY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD?.
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan2
A curious fact about the academic study of religion today is that there is little
agreement about the definition of the object of its study. "Religion" remains
largely undefined. While dozens of definitions have been proffered, none has
gained widespread acceptance. Indeed the passing years bring more definitions
and less agreement. As a scholar of religion, it is my view that one way of get-
ting a purchase on this elusive topic is by approaching it from the perspective of
law. There is a real sense, I think, in which "religion" cannot be understood
apart from an understanding of the cluster of ideas around the invention and reg-
ulation of modem religion, including religious freedom, disestablishment, and
the separation of church and state, ideas that are largely indebted, on the reli-
gious side, to liberal protestant theological reflection and culture ... protestant is
here spelled with a small "p." But more importantly for many, perhaps, from a
public policy standpoint, putting aside the arcane concerns of religion scholars, I
would argue that the instability of religion as a category, given this history, radi-
cally undermines contemporary political commitments to protect religious free-
dom.
I use protestant here loosely to describe a set of political ideas and cultural
practices that emerged in early modem Europe in and after the Reformation, not
in a narrow church-y sense. Religion, "true" religion some would say, on this
modern protestant reading, is private, voluntary, individual, textual, and
believed. Public, coercive, communal, oral and enacted religion, "false" religion
to some, the religion of most of the world and that with which most religion
scholars are concerned, has been carefully and systematically excluded, both
rhetorically and legally, from the modem world. Crudely speaking, it is the first
kind, the modem protestant kind, that is free. The other kind is closely regulated
by law.
Sorting out the history of the working out of this dualism and its ramifications
is complicated, implicated, one might say, in the entire development of individu-
alism in Western thought.3 Let us consider for a minute just the American chap-
ter in this story. What reasons are given in the United States for protecting reli-
gious freedom? There is a well-worn path in American political discourse con-
cerning the constitutional goals of the other First Amendment freedoms: freedom
of speech, of the press and of association. These freedoms are often explicitly
connected in this discourse to theories of democratic governance. Far less well
developed is the conversation about the political goals of legally protected reli-
1. This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper I delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools on January 3, 2003. It was written for oral presentation and lacks full scholarly
apparatus. An article based on this paper will be published in a festschrift for Professor Hans Kippenberg of the
University of Bremen. (Forthcoming 2003 from Walter de Gruyter under the title RELIGION ALS LONGUE DUREE,
edited by Brigitte Luchesi and Kocku von Stuckrad).
2. Dean of Students and Senior Lecturer, The Divinity School, The University of Chicago.
3. Furthermore, one might begin the story at various points. See, e.g., MARCEL GAUCHET, THE
DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF RELIGION 14 (1997).
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gion.4 Religious freedom and the separation of church and state are so funda-
mental to American identity that the deep underlying structure is rarely explored,
in spite of all the talk about religion and politics in this country.' Americans
across the political and theological spectrum affirm religious freedom as founda-
tional. End of conversation. It is heresy to suggest otherwise.
Several reasons for the American constitutional arrangement with respect to
religion are implicit, if not fully realized, in the erratic history of the religion
clauses. For some proponents of freedom, reason enough is that the only alterna-
tive they see is religious establishment. They, like Jefferson, fear rule by impi-
ous clerks, or, like Nativists, rule by the Pope. For others, religious freedom
seems more explicitly rooted in a certain understanding of the human person in
society. On this reading, the best hope we can have for a democratic society is
one constructed in the context of a marketplace of ideas. Religious freedom is
required because free religion makes us better citizens. Or perhaps it is religion
itself that makes us better citizens? There is a long history in this country of reli-
gion being reduced to Sunday school morality in service of the common good.
For yet others, religious freedom is required because a full expression of the self
requires it. For these religious freedom may be best understood as a respect for
conscience, religiously based or otherwise. Some would espouse religious free-
dom because God demands it. Because God scorns a forced faith. Finally, per-
haps most persuasively from my point of view, religious freedom, indeed reli-
gion itself, is important because religion can be prophetic. It can provide an
extra-state location for critiquing government. Religion can be a resource for
alternative human visions that challenge and enrich discussion of public policy.
Like other deeply rooted social facts, the strength of the U.S. commitment may
lie in the multiplicity of these explanations and a reticence about insisting on any
one, in what might be called an underlying but never fully articulated overlap-
ping consensus, a consensus that even its diversity is fundamentally indebted to a
protestant religious understanding. American protestant Christianity is, for the
most part, disestablished, non-doctrinal, moralistic, individualist, pietist, and
based in the Word, broadly understood.
One could argue that the functional public theology of the First Amendment is
narrower still. While usually present in its invisible secularized garb, public
American Protestantism, when overt, creates its own divisions. A recent case
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by some 700
or so Navy Chaplains, Adair v. England, reveals the implicit liberal protestant
theology at the heart of American legal doctrine concerning religion.6 The case
is particularly revealing because the plaintiffs are mainstream American
Christians, not members of marginal religious communities.
4. But see, e.g., FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
5. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002), which makes the argument that
"separation" as a political project was a response to Catholic immigration in the nineteenth century. See also,
THOMAS CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRISTENDOM: THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA (2001), which
makes the argument that Americans have never made a full commitment to the radicalism of the religious
clauses.
6. Adair v. England, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35-38 (2002).
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The military chaplaincies were established, in the words of the Department of
Labor, "to provide for the free exercise of religion for all members of the
Military Services."' The Adair plaintiffs, identifying themselves, in Navy par-
lance, as "non-liturgical" or "low-church" Protestants (capital "P" Protestants),
allege that they are discriminated against by the Navy. Non-liturgical Protestants
are apparently understood by the Navy to be those churches that do not have a
formal liturgy, whose clergy do not wear clerical dress and which do not practice
infant baptism. In other words, Baptists, evangelicals, Pentecostals, and charis-
matic Christians, among others. Making claims based in the first and fourteenth
amendments, plaintiffs say that the Navy unconstitutionally favors Catholic and
"liturgical Protestant" chaplains in hiring, in coveted assigmnents, and in promo-
tions. Navy demographics reveal, they say, Christian religious representation in
the armed forces to be roughly divided as follows: 25% Catholic, 8% liturgical
Protestant and more than 50% non-liturgical. Navy chaplain hiring quotas, how-
ever, provide for one third Catholic, one third liturgical Protestant and one third
non-liturgical Protestant and other.8
In part, the alleged discrimination seems to be a matter of entrenched power,
possibly class-based power. Liturgical Protestant chaplains have managed, it is
claimed, through control of the promotion system, to favor their own. But it is
also a matter of theology. In newspaper articles about the case, the plaintiffs and
their lawyers say that the Navy dislikes the exclusive theology preached by the
Baptist, Pentecostal and non-denominational Christian preachers.' The Navy, it
seems, favors a theology of religious pluralism and universal salvation.
Conservative and evangelical chaplains are less likely, for example, to be asked
to preach a Christmas sermon on a base. Intolerance is not welcome, even if
religiously motivated. In other words, we are all Unitarians now, even Catholics.
Summary judgment was denied in Adair v. England in August 2002. The
case is now in discovery. There are many interesting challenges for the Adair
Court, beginning with the Navy's terminology. Is it constitutional? Is it legal?
Is it rational? To divide American Christians legally into Catholic, Liturgical
Protestant, and non-liturgical protestant? Will the divisions not simply multiply
and divide endlessly like American religion? Where to put Mormons, Quakers,
and Christian Scientists? But more fundamentally, assuming for a moment that
the plaintiffs are right and that the Navy is in fact trying to establish liberal theol-
ogy, in some sense, can the Navy discriminate against what it understands to be
intolerant religion? The plaintiffs will try to persuade the court that this is an
equal protection case. But religion is not like race. Maybe some religions are
un-American.
So ... one difficulty facing proponents of religious freedom is that what I
will call "post-modem" religion, religion that rejects parts of the modem project,
religion that does not always play nice. Religion can be illiberal. It can refuse to
7. U.S. Department of Labor Directive 1304.19 at 3 at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
pdf/d130419091893/d130419p.pdf (Sept. 18, 1993).
8. Adair, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 35-38.
9. See, e.g., Amy Green, Chaplains Hit Navy with Bias Lawsuit, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 13, 2001, at 8.
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occupy the legal space set apart for it by protestant theology and modem law.
Since the 1970s, in fact, illiberal religion seems to be bursting out all over. Yet
the appeal of a modernist notion of religion dies hard. It seems to solve so many
problems. I recently received a call from a law professor interested in reform of
marriage law to include same-sex marriage. She was puzzled as to why religious
marriage and civic marriage could not just be separated. Why was it not enough
for religious groups to discriminate within the group? Letting the state define
religion differently? She seemed puzzled that religious people would want to
define marriage for everyone. Why were they not content with the space they
were assigned? Religion, as she understood it, was private and voluntary, and
free - even if repellent.
Similarly, I was watching Europa Europa" with my adolescent son. A power-
ful movie, Europa Europa tells the story of a young boy fleeing Nazi persecu-
tion. He goes through a series of identity changes. He is captured first by the
Soviets and becomes a communist. He is then adopted by an aristocratic
German family and becomes the very model of a cultured German. In each per-
sona, in a series of painful scenes laced with black humor, he attempts to conceal
his circumcision. Finally, he is recognized and mocked for being a Jew. My
son's immediate response was that he was no longer a Jew. He had voluntarily
renounced his faith at the beginning of the film when he joined the communist
youth. How could religion remain a salient feature of his identity after that? It
made no sense to persecute him for it.
For the law professor and for my son, one of whom is Jewish and the other of
whom is Roman Catholic, religion is something individual, chosen, private-and
believed, something publicly and politically invisible ... and harmless, in other
words. It should neither determine the choices of the religious outsider nor per-
sist beyond a voluntary renunciation. Each was genuinely shocked that religion
might be understood any other way-and so give rise to violence and intoler-
ance. I think each would be stymied by the Adair case, but the Adair case neatly
presents, without mentioning Islam, the dilemma faced by religious freedom
activists today.
Two oft-stated goals of American foreign policy today, apart from regime
change in Iraq and a free market, are one, international enforcement of guaran-
tees of religious freedom and, two, global extension of the rule of law. Religion
and law, yoked in various ways over the centuries of Western history, are here
linked to provide the sine qua non for free and open societies. Consider these
words from the State Department's 2002 International Religious Freedom
Report:
It is the policy of the United States Government to promote reli-
gious freedom worldwide, for every human being, regardless of
religion, race, culture or nationality... every human being has a
fundamental right to believe, worship and practice according to
10. CCC Filmkunst/Les Films du Losange (1990).
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his or her own conscience... [R]eligious freedom is universal in
its importance and applicability. It is one of those "unalienable
rights" acknowledged in our own Declaration of
Independence-a right not granted by governments, but rather
the birthright of every human being, in every nation and culture.
. A government that knowledges and protects freedom of reli-
gion and conscience is one that understands the inherent and
inviolable dignity of the human person. Such a government is
far more likely to protect, through the rule of law, the other
rights fundamental to human dignity... 
Religion freely chosen by the individual and secular law impartially and democ-
ratically administered by a state dedicated to due process and human rights are
here proclaimed the "natural" characteristics of human society.
Are religious freedom-American style-and the rule of law what human dig-
nity require? Modesty, at the very least, suggests that Americans begin with the
acknowledgment, all too rarely made, that even in America, "belief, worship and
practice" are not always fully and unreservedly protected ... and that, even here,
the rule of law is often incomplete. But I do not simply want to point to our fail-
ure to live up to our own ideals. It is the ideals themselves that I want to discuss
here, lest we once again find ourselves hawking shopworn goods that have long
since passed their sell dates. "Imperial liberalism," the anthropologist Richard
Shweder calls it, in a recent article.' 2
Indeed, far from being "natural," I would argue, even in Western democracies
religious freedom and the rule of law are modernist constructs, constructs that
have been largely subsumed by capitalist and scientific understandings of the
human person and of society, understandings only occasionally relieved by reli-
giously defined possibilities or by the humanism of legal liberalism. While some
in the legal world seem to think that religion will rescue law, and maybe some in
religious circles think that law will rescue religion, I suggest that it could well be
the case that these idealistic instantiations of modernist myths cling to one anoth-
er as to a drowning man, while the survivors, both oppressors and liberators, are
otherwise occupied. Both law and religion today compete with other, arguably
more powerful, systems for epistemic and regulatory authority.
The academic study of religion, as I have said, has been much occupied in the
last twenty-five years with a search for origins, not for the origin either of reli-
gion in general or even of particular religions - those were Victorian projects
- but for the origin of the term "religion," and of scholarly interest in "reli-
gion." The religious historian, Jonathan Z. Smith, recently reviewed the etymo-
logical history of "religion.' 3  He concluded that "religion," in its modern
11. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, The International
Religious Freedom Reports for 2002, at http://wwwstate.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13607pf.htm (Oct. 7, 2002).
12. Richard A. Schweder, et al, 'What About Female Genital Mutilation?'and Why Understanding Culture
Matters in the First Place, in ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL
DEMOCRACIES 235 (2002).
13. Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES (Mark
Taylor, ed., 1998).
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sense, used to describe a universal attribute of human society, originates in the
seventeenth century. It is a term invented by Europeans to describe the others
they encountered in their "explorations." Noting that most languages lack a
word for "religion," he insists that "'[r]eligion' is not a native term; it is a term
invented by scholars for their intellectual purposes."14
The anthropologist Talal Asad would add to Smith's etymology that this colo-
nialist invention of "religion" as an autonomous cultural form can only be under-
stood in the context of the invention of the nation-state. "[The] separation of
religion from power," he says, "is a modem Western norm, the product of a
unique post-Reformation history.' 5 He continues:
[W]hat appears to anthropologists today to be self-evident,
namely that religion is essentially a matter of symbolic mean-
ings linked to ideas of general order (expressed through either or
both rite and doctrine), that it has generic functions/features, and
that it must not be confused with any of its particular historical
or cultural forms, is in fact a view that has a specific Christian
history.16
"Religion" as an autonomous social and cultural form, he says, emerges from
religious practices embedded in the medieval church. Asad, an anthropologist of
Christianity and Islam, insists that
From being a concrete set of practical rules attached to specific
[medieval] processes of power and knowledge, religion has
come to be abstracted and universalized. In this movement we
have not merely an increase in religious toleration ... but the
mutation of a concept and a range of social practices which is
itself part of a wider change in the modem landscape of power
and knowledge. That change included a new kind of state.. . 7
In other words, religion, like law, education, etc., is differentiated, as sociologists
would say, from other social institutions, in the early modem period, and is
changed in the process of that differentiation. Religion becomes "religion"-
both as an object of academic study and as a tool of the emerging modem state.
The story of the invention of modem religion has both a European and an
American version. They are related but the European version has been more
clearly marked by the social history of war, beginning with the wars of religion
in the first half of the seventeenth century. Europeans today live more openly
with the ruins, ideational and material, of a long and complex, often horrifying,
religious history, inscribed in the land and in the culture. An ocean's remove
14. Id. at281.
15. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND
ISLAM 28 (1993).
16. Id. at 42.
17. Id. at 42-43.
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from that violence, the American story of religion has been determined chiefly
by law, by immigration, and by religious pluralism. Americans have been "pil-
grims in their own land," as Martin Marty puts it," a land strangely empty.
Americans create their religion anew in spaces quite clearly, and intentionally,
bounded by their law. Secular law and the denominational form of religion have
developed together. As Sidney Mead has argued, "religious freedom and the
challenge of the frontier's unchurched shaped certain colonial religious patterns
into the structure we recognize as American denominationalism."19 (There is, of
course, a violence underlying the American story, a violence retold in black
churches and in Indian country, among other places, but it is less evident in the
majority story, than in Europe).
Hans Kippenberg, professor of religion at the University of Bremen and a
leading European scholar of religion, has recently written a book tracing the
development of the scholarly investigation of religion in modem Europe begin-
ning with the philosophers of the Enlightenment." Kippenberg concludes that
religion, paradoxically perhaps, has been "good to think" for modems, an indis-
pensable element, in fact, of the modernist project." In response to the wars of
religion, Kippenberg begins, the philosophers, from Hobbes and Hume to Kant
and Rousseau, assigned to religion a limited but crucial function for the modern
secular nation-state: the production of morality. The romantics, Herder,
Schliermacher, Hegel and Schopenhauer, reacting against the hyper-rationality
of the philosophers, celebrated religion as the realm of tradition, of feeling, and
of the irrational. Religion was about one's experience of the world, not about
being good.
During the same period, historical archaeological investigation of the Bible
and a flood of new evidence about non-Christian religions, beginning with the
discovery of the Rosetta Stone in 1799, was working to radically relativize the
religion of both the philosophers and the romantics. Darwin's and Lyell's dis-
coveries led to an examination of Biblical texts that entirely undermined biblical
chronology, massively lengthening human history, and prompting a feverish
rethinking of religion in human history. Some nineteenth century European the-
orists proposed that language was the key to understanding the history of reli-
gions-tracing back key religious terms, they argued, would enable one to discov-
er the original true religion, common to all the Aryan peoples, since corrupted by
the "disease of language." Others proposed a story of religious progress from
"natural" religion to "ethical" religion. News of contemporary tribal societies
led to theories of the "primitive" and their relationship to the story of religion.
Arguments were had as to whether religion precedes myth or myth precedes ritu-
al. How was sacrifice to be understood? What was magic? Americans, too,
contributed to the social scientific investigation of religion. Most notably,
William James. Religion, he opined, after a survey of the testimony of religious
18. MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500 YEARS OF AMERICAN RELIGION (1984).
19. SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 133 (1963).
20. HANS G. KIPPENBERG, DISCOVERING RELIGIOUS HISTORY IN THE MODERN AGE, (Barbara Harshaw, trans.,
Princeton University Press, 2002).
21. Id. at 187-95.
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virtuosos, is "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their soli-
tude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they
consider divine."22 The contemporary field of religious studies traces its origins
to these Victorian theorists.
Note that virtually all of this scholarship is culturally protestant. Jonathan Z.
Smith, mentioned above, has delineated the peculiar coming together of
Protestant theology and scholarship about religion in a little book called
Drudgery Divine,23 which shows how virtually all modem biblical scholarship
was apologetically motivated, and until very recently, shaped by protestant theo-
logical doctrine about biblical interpretation.
Interestingly, religion did not disappear under this intense and often skeptical
scrutiny, in the U.S. or in Europe. Or at least talk of religion did not disappear.
Indeed religion and religious studies are flourishing, if bookstores and websites
are any evidence. But scholars of religion are deeply divided as to the end prod-
uct of the modem study of religion. Is it that "religion" has been shown to be so
historically specific to the story of the West that it cannot be understood to have
any persistent universal referent? This would seem to be the position that most
anthropologists and historians seem to take. They prefer other categories and
other ways of explaining human motivation and behavior. Religion for them is
epiphenomenal. For others, "religion" usefully describes, in some complicated
way that incorporates all of the discoveries as well as the post-modem critique, a
universal cultural product dependent on structures of human consciousness, one
that is usefully mapped using such categories as myth, ritual, sacrifice, code,
canon, and cult, one that is common to all societies.
But the story of the invention of religious studies, in spite of Asad and others,
often omits the political and legal structures that have constrained its activity.
While "religion" may be the invention of scholars, it is also the invention of
politicians, lawyers and judges, and of scholars with political agendas. The
extraordinary rhetorical power of the idea that Americans, with a little help from
Europe, invented religious freedom, a power that transcends many conventional
political divides, conceals a complex and violent history. The success of the
American commitment to religious freedom, depends, in a sense, I would argue,
on a bargain struck at the end of the eighteenth century: Religion was to be free
but only in so far as it was understood to be individual, believed, and chosen, in
other words, in so far as it was protestant.
I call this a bargain. It was not a literal bargain, of course. It was a gradually
negotiated bargain, negotiated in both academic and legal engagements. In dif-
ferent ways throughout the American colonies, the idea and practice grew that
religion properly belonged to the individual. Each individual was master of her
own religious fate. Anne Hutchinson and others in the colonies who suffered
persecution for this view, proved prophets in the long run. Americans recognize
no human authority when it comes to religious orthodoxy. Free religion is
believed, something internal and private, hence the synonym "faith."24  And
22. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 31 (1996).
23. JONATHAN Z. SMITH, DRUDGERY DIVINE: ON THE COMPARISON OF EARLY CHRISTIANITIES AND THE
RELIGIONS OF LATE ANTIQUITY (1990).
24. See, Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Belief in CRITICAL TERMS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 28 (Mark C. Taylor, ed.,
1998).
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religion is freely chosen, not something determined by your family or by your
ethnic identity. Religion that is communal rather than individual, enacted rather
than believed, and given rather than chosen, the religion of most of the world, is
not true religion, and therefore is not entitled to be legally protected.
This new religion, the religion invented by the Reformation and by
Enlightenment thinkers and politicians, was something that would serve the
emerging nation state. Summarizing the modem scholarly investigation of reli-
gion, Talal Asad adds:
It may be a happy accident that this effort of defining religion
converges with the liberal demand in our time that they be kept
quite separate from politics, law and science-spaces in which
varieties of power and reason articulate our distinctively modem
life. This definition is at once part of a strategy (for secular lib-
erals) of the confinement, and (for liberal Christians) of the
defense of religion.
25
Religion survived politically when it adhered to the Faustian bargain it struck
with the emerging liberal state. Any demand by religious illiberals, of the right
or the left, that liberals put their money where their mouths are and extend the
protection of religion to all religion, causes problems.
As Philip Hamburger has dramatically shown in his new book, Separation of
Church and State, anti-Catholicism was a key element in the increasing
American commitment to a strict separation of church and state, beginning in the
antebellum period. If a public role for Catholics was to be the result of a broad
reading of religious freedom, then a hyper-privatization and separation of reli-
gion was necessary. Rather than share public space with Catholics, Protestants
relinquished their own claim to that space. That hyper-privatization lasted well
past World War II. Today, however, as Catholics have entered fully into main-
stream American political life and into participation in the liberal hegemony, pri-
vatization and separation are ending, as can be seen in the recent school cases.
Separation is no longer seen to be necessary-at least as far as keeping the
Catholics out is concemed. And the free exercise clause has simply been evis-
cerated. The religion of the Supreme Court today is less and less the modemist
source of morality, and more and more just one more private association, one
more "point of view." Equality and neutrality rule the roost.2 Religion may
have been good to think, as Kippenberg argues, for the modems, but today it has
much less traction.
Now to turn for a moment to law, modem law. A parallel story of law could
be told, and has been in a number of recent works. Law, too, Donald Kelley has
argued, while greatly transformed in the modem period, has been good to think
for modems. In The Human Measure, Kelley argues that law in the West has
25. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN CHRISTIANITY AND
ISLAM 28 (1993).
26. See Willifred F. Sullivan, Neutralizing Religion or What is the Opposite of 'Faith-based?', HISTORY OF
RELIGIONS JouRNAL 41:4 (2002).
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been a prime site of reflection on the human condition. He is eloquent in
recounting the Western philosophical dance between nomos and physis. In spite
of the apparent dominance of science, he insists that we still live anthropocentri-
cally:
The forces of Physis are intimidating. Across the ages natural
science has affected to tear off the cultural masks hiding "reali-
ty," but beneath there is always another disguise, another per-
sona (which signifies a mask as well as a human subject);
though "put to the question," as Bacon thought, "nature will lie
to the very end." In the investigation of human "nature" in his-
torical context, in other words, there is no end to myth-no "last"
myth to be deciphered. The strength of social thought in the
"nomical" mode is that it accepts the limits of human insight,
and rejects the "abuses of reason" that perennially recur in the
effort to reduce human experience to a manageable code... 28
Law appears, on his reading, a hero of humanistic values. The book ends: "King
Nomos rules."29
While few would deny the power of the return today to "rule of law" talk, few
would also deny its compromised nature. Law in the U.S. is being de-constitu-
tionalized and the same law, which had enabled greater equality and provided
mechanisms for enforcement and intervention by the poor, now works to create
structures for the accumulation of wealth and the legitimation of state violence.
Tim Murphy argues in a recent book written in answer to Kelley that the power
and humanity of the common law depended on a hierarchy of authority that was
linked to Christianity" and depended on what he calls "the penetrative scheme."
He concludes that law today is only one among a group of parallel structures,
among which we might include religion, which compete for power. Each is
dependent only on its persuasive capacity because hierarchy has been perma-
nently dethroned. Evocation of the "rule of law," Murphy says, can become a
cover for a dangerously depoliticized law:
[T]he more law is detached from politics in systemic terms--i.e.
the further we move away from the era of adjudicative govern-
ment-the more 'irresponsible' both lawyers and judges become,
or at least, the more they can claim (and perhaps feel) that their
primary responsibility is to 'the law itself, or 'the rule of law'
or 'legality', self-referential labels or, in other terms, myths. 1
Ironically, perhaps, modern religion, private, voluntary, individual, and believed,
like modem law, also depended on the "penetrative scheme," and on hierarchical
authority.
27. DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1990).
28. Id. at 282.
29. Id. at 283.
30. See TIM MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE?: CONFIGURATIONS OF LAW AND MODERNITY (1997).
31. Id. at 207.
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EXPORTING MODERNITY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD?
Both religion and law make both nomical and physical claims. Each has its
natural law mode and its historically conditioned engagement with local knowl-
edge. Efforts by both, however to challenge effectively the capitalist and scien-
tistic physis can only be partial. Each may have more success at the contingent
and provisional. Guyora Binder has recently described law, and other cultural
products as discursive fields, without autonomous authority.32
Hazardous as it is to speak of either modemity or post-modernity, and I do so
here in lower case, as a short hand for a set of historical events rather than as an
ideological commitment, I venture to ally myself here with those who believe
that a real change has occurred in the last fifty to hundred years-in which the
break-up of the colonial empires, the triumph of the market, and the pace of sci-
entistic explanation for human motivation, has so eroded the modem confidence
in free religion and in law, that caution at least is necessary when United States
power is mobilized to promote their extension. Activists promoting religious
freedom today appear to see their task as the simple one of inclusion-inclusion
by analogy, in the modemist regime of religious freedom, of religious groups
that have been historically discriminated against, both here and abroad. The
missionary fervor of this effort is particularly dramatic in the curious case of
those working to promote the rights of new religious movements in Europe.
There are many others, including those who with to have rights to proselytiza-
tion legalized.
All of these efforts are undermined, in my view, by their reliance on outdated
modemist definitions of religion-and law. Outsiders are not always willing to
conform their religious practices to their demands. And law can only do so
much. After the decision in the Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Association
case,33 for example, it became clear to Indian activists that the First Amendment
could not do the work that was asked of it. Not simply because of prejudice or
even of the threat to federal sovereignty. But explicitly because "religion" as a
category did not describe the claim that was made in Lyng. Vine Deloria and
others called for a return to treaties as a more promising avenue for the protec-
tion of native practices.'
The startling disjuncture between claims of religious freedom and the denial
of such self-determination to much of the world's religion, on the one hand, and
the appearance of widespread realpolitik instead of the rule of law, in America's
internal regulation as well as in defense of its sovereignty and policing of its bor-
ders, suggests a need for a reexamination of rationales for laws privileging reli-
gion and the bargain made by the Protestant churches, a bargain that Sidney
Mead called "the Trojan horse in the comfortable citadel of [American] denomi-
nationalism.""
32. See LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY (Austin Sarat et al.eds., 2002).
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355 John Wunder ed., 1999).
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